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INTRODUCTION
While not breaking any new ground, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (“Federal Circuit”) trademark
decisions rendered during 2010 provide colorful applications of wellfounded substantive trademark law principles and illustrate
numerous procedural cautionary tales. During 2010, the Federal
1
Circuit issued twenty-three trademark decisions and designated eight
1. In re Sharp, No. 2010-1148, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13,
2010) (per curiam); Bell’s Brewery, Inc. v. Bell Hill Vineyards, L.L.C., No. 2010-1280,
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25499 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2010) (per curiam); ERBE
Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Technology L.L.C., 629 F.3d 1278, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Anthony’s Pizza Holding Co. v. Anthony’s Pizza & Pasta
Int’l, Inc., No. 2010-1191, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23898 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2010) (per
curiam); Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2010-1422, 2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS 26870 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2010); In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d
1346, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Green Edge Enters. v. Rubber Mulch Etc.,
L.L.C., 620 F.3d 1287, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re The Lex
Group VA, 383 F. App’x 949 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Outdoor Kids, Inc. v.
Parris Mfg. Co., 385 F. App’x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Deere & Co. v. ITC, 605 F.3d
1350, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Sadeh v. Biggs, 374 F. App’x 996
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Fred Beverages, Inc. v. Fred’s Capital Mgmt. Co., 605
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2

as precedential. One case consisted of an appeal from the United
3
States International Trade Commission (“ITC”), two cases were
4
appeals from decisions by United States District Courts, and the
remaining twenty cases consisted of appeals from the United States
Patent and Trademark Office’s (“Trademark Office”) Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or the “Board”).
Of the twenty cases appealed from the TTAB, seven involved an ex
5
parte appeal of application refusals, five involved cancellation
6
proceedings, including one cancellation counterclaim, eight
7
involved opposition proceedings, and one involved a consolidated
8
cancellation and opposition proceeding.
Five of the eight
precedential trademark decisions predominantly involved substantive
F.3d 963, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1958 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Achenbach Buschhutten
GmbH, No. 2010-1192, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12248 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2010); Crash
Dummy Movie, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); Odom’s Tenn. Pride Sausage, Inc. v. FF Acquisition, L.L.C., 600 F.3d
1343, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2030 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Campbell v. Bassani Mfg., 368 F.
App’x 133 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), reh’g denied, No. 2009-1534, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9432 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2010); Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc., 367 F. App’x
161 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); In re Mi Pueblo San Jose, Inc., 367 Fed. App’x 144
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Stoller v. Best Data Prods., Inc., No. 2010-1031, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 4354 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2010); Univ. of S.C. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 367 F.
App’x 129 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 387 (2010); Found. for a Christian
Civilization, Inc. v. Mary Queen of the Third Millenium, Inc., 360 F. App’x 150 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (per curiam); In re Hyatt, No. 2009-1229, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26199
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 7, 2010).
2. ERBE, 629 F.3d 1278, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048; In re Chippendales, 622 F.3d
1346, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681; Green Edge, 620 F.3d 1287, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1425; Deere, 605 F.3d 1350, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206; Fred Beverages, 605 F.3d 963,
94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1958; Mattel, 601 F.3d 1387, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1315; In re
Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257; Odom’s, 600 F.3d 1343, 93
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2030.
3. Deere, 605 F.3d 1350, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206.
4. ERBE, 629 F.3d 1278, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048; Green Edge, 620 F.3d 1287,
96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425.
5. In re Sharp, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356 at *1; In re Chippendales, 622 F.3d at
1348, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681; In re The Lex Group, 383 F. App’x at 949; In re
Achenbach, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12248 at *1; In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d at 1344,
94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257; In re Mi Pueblo, 367 Fed. App’x at *1; In re Hyatt, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 26199 at *1.
6. Gen. Cas. Co., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26870 at *1; Outdoor Kids, 385 F. App’x at
993; Fred Beverages, 605 F.3d at 964, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958; Super Bakery, 367 F.
App’x at 162; Univ. of S.C., 367 F. App’x at 131 (cancellation counterclaim).
7. Bell’s Brewery, Inc. v. Bell Hill Vineyards, L.L.C., No. 2010-1280, 2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS 25499, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2010) (per curiam); Sadeh v. Biggs, 374
F. App’x 996, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Mattel, 601 F.3d at 1389, 94
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315; Odom’s, 600 F.3d at 1344, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2030;
Campbell v. Bassani Mfg., 368 F. App’x 133, 133 (Fed. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, No.
2009-1534, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 9432 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2010); Super Bakery, 367 F.
App’x at 162; Univ. of S.C., 367 F. App’x at 131; Found. for a Christian Civilization,
Inc. v. Mary Queen of the Third Millenium, Inc., 360 F. App’x 150, 150 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (per curiam).
8. Anthony’s Pizza Holding Co. v. Anthony’s Pizza & Pasta Int’l, Inc., No. 20101191, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23898, at *1–2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2010) (per curiam).
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issues, two predominantly involved TTAB procedural issues, and
11
one presented both significant substantive and procedural issues.
Of note, in five of the six per curiam cases, the Federal Circuit
rendered judgments without written opinions after the parties had
12
fully briefed and argued the appeals.
Each of these judgments
affirmed the decision of the TTAB, and all related to substantive
trademark issues. Consequently, in 2010, thirty-three percent of all
appeals of substantive trademark issues to the Federal Circuit resulted
in the Federal Circuit affirming without a written opinion.
In fourteen of fifteen appeals of substantive trademark law issues,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s or district court’s decision;
often, this was because the Board or court had evaluated and weighed
evidence relating to likelihood of confusion, abandonment, inherent
13
distinctiveness, genericism, or descriptiveness. In two instances, the
Federal Circuit reversed or vacated TTAB orders due to the TTAB’s
14
Additionally, the
misapplication of its own procedural rules.
Federal Circuit dismissed three appeals before they were heard
because the appellant or the appellant’s counsel failed to follow the
15
Federal Circuit’s procedural rules. In one instance, upon request of
the Board, the Federal Circuit vacated an appeal of an ex parte
decision because the registration upon which the application denial

9. In re Chippendales, 622 F.3d at 1348, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681; Green Edge,
620 F.3d at 1290, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425; Mattel, 601 F.3d at 1389, 94
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315; In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d at 1344, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1257; Mary Queen, 360 F. App’x at 150.
10. Fred Beverages, 605 F.3d at 964, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958; In re Hyatt, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 26199, at *1.
11. Odom’s, 600 F.3d at 1344–45, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2030.
12. In re Sharp, No. 2010-1148, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec.
13, 2010) (per curiam) (without opinion); Bell’s Brewery, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
25499, at *1 (without opinion); Anthony’s Pizza, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23898, at *1–
10 (with opinion); In re The Lex Group VA, 383 F. App’x 949, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(per curiam) (without opinion); Mary Queen, 360 F. App’x at 150 (without opinion).
13. Only in Deere v. ITC, 605 F.3d 1350, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206 (Fed. Cir.
2010), which was an appeal from a decision of the ITC regarding interpretation of
the Tariff Act of 1930, did the Federal Circuit vacate and remand on a substantive
trademark law issue. Id. at 1361–62, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
14. Fred Beverages, 605 F.3d at 967, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958 (reversed and
remanded); Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc., 367 F. App’x 161, 163 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(per curiam) (vacated).
15. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2010-1422, 2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS 26870 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2010) (dismissed for failure to file timely appeal
brief); In re Achenbach Buschhutten GmbH, No. 2010-1192, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
12248, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2010) (dismissed for counsel’s failure to become a
member of the bar); Stoller v. Best Data Prods., Inc., No. 2010-1031, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4354, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2010) (dismissed for failure to pay docketing
fee).
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was based was cancelled just days before the oral argument on the
16
appeal.
Each of the Federal Circuit’s 2010 trademark decisions is discussed
in detail below. In a few instances, the opinions involve both
17
noteworthy substantive and procedural determinations.
In such
cases, both the substantive and procedural issues are discussed
together in Part I, Substantive Trademark Issues. In the interest of
brevity, facts and issues unrelated to trademark law are omitted from
the case discussions.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Likelihood of Confusion

University of South Carolina v. University of Southern California
18
In University of South Carolina v. University of Southern California, the
Federal Circuit upheld the TTAB’s decision to sustain Southern
California’s opposition to South Carolina’s trademark application for
a stylized SC mark, given the likelihood of confusion with Southern
19
California’s prior SC registration. Further, the court upheld the
TTAB’s dismissal of South Carolina’s cancellation counterclaim,
which alleged that Southern California’s use of “SC” created a false
20
connection with the state of South Carolina. However, the court
disagreed with the TTAB’s lack of standing determination, and

1.

16. In re Hyatt, No. 2009-1229, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26199, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan.
7, 2010).
17. In re Sharp, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356, at *1 (affirming the TTAB’s review
of both the refusal of registration on the grounds that the applicant’s mark was
merely descriptive of the applicant’s services—the procedural issue—and that the
mark’s name was generic—the substantive issue); Odom’s Tenn. Pride Sausage, Inc.
v. FF Acquisition, L.L.C., 600 F.3d 1343, 1346–47, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2030, 2030
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding both that the TTAB was not required to consider
unregistered marks in its “likelihood of confusion” analysis—the procedural issue—
and that a single “likelihood of confusion” factor may be dispositive when that factor
is the dissimilarity of the marks at issue—the substantive issue); Campbell v. Bassani
Mfg., 368 F. App’x 133, 134–35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (addressing the propriety of
evaluating use by competitors in determining whether a mark is generic—the
procedural issue—and whether the TTAB correctly granted summary judgment
against the applicant—the substantive issue); Univ. of S.C. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 367 F.
App’x 129, 132, 135 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 387 (2010) (addressing the
TTAB’s grant of summary judgment against South Carolina on South Carolina’s
counterclaim—the procedural issue—and the TTAB’s refusal to register South
Carolina’s mark based on a likelihood of confusion—the substantive issue).
18. 367 F. App’x 129 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 387 (2010). This opinion
also involves a false connection counterclaim and a related standing issue. Id.
19. Id. at 134–35.
20. Id. at 131, 135–37.
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when purchasing the goods, and the absence of evidence of actual
25
confusion.
With regard to the trade channels, Southern California had limited
its goods identification in International Class 25 to include only
26
“university authorized” goods. The Federal Circuit agreed with the
TTAB that this included “any trade channels which are or could be
27
Thus, the
authorized or approved by [Southern] California.”
Federal Circuit found no error in the TTAB’s conclusion that South
Carolina’s goods would appear in the same trade channels as
28
Southern California’s.
With respect to the care exercised by consumers, the Federal
Circuit agreed with South Carolina that the TTAB’s conclusions
regarding a lower level of care exercised by gift-purchasers and “new
or casual fans” rested on speculation, rather than substantial
29
evidence. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that even if the
TTAB erred on this point, it was a harmless error that would not
30
warrant reversal of the Board’s decision on likelihood of confusion.
Turning to the lack of actual confusion factor, the Federal Circuit
held that, being presented with no evidence that the parties’ marks
“appeared together for a significant length of time,” the TTAB had
properly given little weight to the absence of evidence of actual
31
confusion.
factors are: 1) the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression; 2) the similarity or
dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or
registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use; 3) the similarity or
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels; 4) the conditions under
which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated
purchasing; 5) the fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use); 6) the
number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods; 7) the nature and
extent of any actual confusion; 8) the length of time during and conditions under
which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion; 9) the
variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, “family” mark,
product mark); 10) the market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior
mark: a) a mere “consent” to register or use, b) agreement provisions designed to
preclude confusion, i.e. limitations on continued use of the marks by each party, c)
assignment of mark, application, registration and good will of the related business,
or d) laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and indicative of lack
of confusion; 11) the extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from
use of its mark on its goods; 12) the extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de
minimis or substantial; and 13) any other established fact probative of the effect of
use. In re DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
25. Univ. of S.C., 367 F. App’x at 132.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 132–33 (quoting Univ. of S. Cal. v. Univ. of S.C., No. 91125615, 2008
WL 3333839, at *8 (T.T.A.B. 2008)).
28. Id. at 133.
29. Id. at 133–34.
30. Id. at 134.
31. Id. at 135.
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The Federal Circuit’s ruling regarding standing on South
Carolina’s cancellation counterclaim is perhaps the more notable
part of this case. South Carolina’s counterclaim was based on Section
32
2(a) of the Lanham Act, alleging that Southern California’s use of
33
“SC” created a false connection with the state of South Carolina.
The TTAB granted summary judgment to Southern California on the
counterclaim because it believed that the University of South
Carolina was not an agency of the State of South Carolina, and thus,
that the University of South Carolina lacked standing to assert a
Section 2(a) claim based on a false association between the University
34
of Southern California and the State of South Carolina.
The
Federal Circuit rejected the TTAB’s reasoning, without deciding
whether the University of South Carolina was an agent of the state,
and held that in order to establish standing South Carolina only
needed to show: 1) that it had a reasonable belief that it would be
damaged by Southern California’s registration and 2) that it had a
35
direct and personal stake in the cancellation of that registration.
The Federal Circuit concluded that South Carolina did, in fact,
36
establish standing.
Nevertheless, the court affirmed the TTAB’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Southern California on this issue because, in
order to prevail, South Carolina needed to show that there was a
genuine issue for trial on whether the initials “SC” “point uniquely”
37
to the State of South Carolina. In the context of another issue,
South Carolina itself had submitted evidence that “at least sixteen
38
other universities and colleges represent themselves as ‘SC.’” In
light of this evidence, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that
South Carolina’s counterclaim could not survive summary
39
judgment.
In re Mi Pueblo San Jose, Inc.
40
In In re Mi Pueblo San Jose, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed, in an
unpublished, per curiam opinion, the TTAB’s ruling that consumer
confusion is likely between the applicant’s MI PUEBLO (and Design)
2.

32. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006).
33. Univ. of S.C., 367 F. App’x at 131.
34. See id. at 136 (summarizing and affirming the TTAB’s grant of summary
judgment against South Carolina on its cancellation counterclaim).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., 703
F.2d 1372, 1377, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 505, 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
38. Id. at 136.
39. Id.
40. 367 Fed. App’x 144 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
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M Pueblo San Jose, Inc., No. 76/679,535, 2009
2
TTAB LE
EXIS
214, at *13 (T.T.A.B. Mar.
M 27, 2009).
42. In
I re Mi Pueblo, 2009 TTAB LE
EXIS 214, at *15
5.
43. Id.
I at *3.
44. Id.
I at *5–6.
45. Id.
I at *8.
46. Id.
I at *13–14.
47. Id.
I at *15.
48. 600
6 F.3d 1343, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2030 (F
Fed. Cir. 2010). This opinion also
involves a procedural issue
i
regarding
g the effect of claims that arre not pled. Idd. at
1346, 93 U.S.P.Q. 2d (B
BNA) at 2031.
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likeliho
ood of co
onfusion ex
xisted betweeen the appellant
a
fo
ood
produccer’s registerred farm boyy marks:

and the
e appellee su
upermarket’s farm boy mark.
m

49

The central issue on appeall involved Odom’s
O
conteention that the
TTAB inappropriaately failed to consideer Odom’s common law
50
mark rights. The Federaal Circuit dissmissed Odo
om’s argumeent,
tradem
holding
g that whilee opposition
n claims maay be asserteed based up
pon
commo
on law righ
hts, Odom’ss failed to plead or reference any
a
commo
on law rightts in the no
otice of opp
position and instead rellied
51
only up
pon its federral registratio
ons. The Federal
F
Circu
uit held thatt, in
such circumstance
c
es, the TTA
AB is not required
r
to
o consider any
a
52
unpled
d, unregisterred marks in
i its analyssis.
The Federal
F
Circcuit
noted that while Section
S
528.07(b) of th
he TRADEMA
ARK TRIAL AND
A
L BOARD MANUAL
A
OF PROCEDURE
R
p
permits
the TTAB
T
to deeem
APPEAL
pleadin
ngs as having
g been amen
nded to incllude any unp
pled issues, the
5
53
TTAB is
i not requirred to do so.
The Federal Cirrcuit next afffirmed the TTAB’s con
nclusion und
der
the DuP
uPont factors that the parrties’ marks are
a sufficiently dissimilarr in
54
appearrance as to create diffeerent comm
mercial impressions.
T
The
Federaal Circuit citted the distiinctions in the
t
marks ass found by the
TTAB, namely thatt the farm bo
oys’ hands and feet diffeered in size and
a
shape, that their hats
h
differed
d in shape an
nd style, and
d that one boy
b
m
and sh
hoes on his feet while the
had a piece of straw in his mouth
55
er’s farm bo
oys had neith
her. The Federal
F
Circcuit found that
t
oppose
the TT
TAB had properly
p
disssected the marks in making those
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
I at 1344–46, 93
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2030––31.
Id.
I at 1345–46, 93
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2031.
Id.
I at 1346, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d
U
(BN
NA) at 2031.
Id.,
I 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 20
031.
Id.,
I 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 20
032.
Id.
I at 1346–47, 93
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2032.
Id.
I at 1346, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d
U
(BN
NA) at 2032.
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56

distincttions. Acccordingly, th
he court affiirmed the TTAB’s
T
holding
that the visual distinctio
ons betweeen the marks
m
creaated
“unque
estionably different commercial
c
impression
ns” and that
t
dissimiilarity of thee marks in and of itsellf was a suff
fficient basiss to
57
dismisss an oppositiion.
In re Mighty Leeaf Tea
58
In In
n re Mighty Leaf
L
Tea, th
he Federal Circuit
C
upheeld the TTA
AB’s
conclusion that customer confusion was likely between the
tradem
marks ML and
a
ML MARK
M
LEES
S (stylized), as used in
59
connecction with reelated skin care
c
products. As a reesult, the co
ourt
60
found that
t
the ML trademark was
w unregistrrable.
Migh
hty Leaf Tea applied to register
r
the mark
m
“ML” in
n Internatio
onal
Class 3 for “perso
onal care products
p
and skin caree preparatio
ons,
namelyy, skin soap,, body wash, foam bath
h, body lotio
on, body scrrub,
61
bath saalts and maassage oil; potpourri;
p
in
ncense.”
T
The
Examining
Attorne
ey refused registration of Mightyy Leaf Tea’s mark und
der
Section
n 2(d) of th
he Lanham Act,
A finding that the ap
pplied-for mark
was like
ely to be con
nfused with the
t following
g pre-existing
g mark:
4.

62

(“ML MARK LEE
ES (stylized) mark”).
The ML MARK LE
EES
ed) mark is registered in
n Internatio
onal Class 3, in connection
(stylize
with “sskin care products, naamely, skin cleanser, sk
kin toner, skin
cream, skin lotion,, skin mask gel, make-u
up foundatio
on, powder and
a
63
Mighty Leaf
L
Tea ap
ppealed the refusal to register to the
blush.””
64
6
TTAB.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.,
I 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 20
032.
Id.,
I 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 20
032.
601
6 F.3d 1342, 94
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (F
Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id.
I at 1344, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d
U
(BN
NA) at 1257.
Id.,
I 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 12
257.
Id.,
I 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 12
257.
Id.
I at 1344–45, 94
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
Id.
I at 1345, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d
U
(BN
NA) at 1258.
Id.,
I 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 12
258.
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In comparing the marks, the TTAB found the “ML” designation to
be the dominant portion of both marks, and thereby dismissed
Mighty Leaf Tea’s argument that the marks differ in appearance so
65
much that there would be no likelihood of confusion. The Federal
66
Circuit agreed with the TTAB on this conclusion and affirmed.
Mighty Leaf Tea’s arguments to the TTAB and to the Federal
Circuit focused on the sixth DuPont factor: “‘[t]he number and
67
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.’” Mighty Leaf Tea
argued that its evidence of third-party use of the “ML” mark shows
that “ML” is a weak mark, and thus, that even minor variations of the
68
cited registration should be registrable. It argued to the Federal
Circuit that the TTAB had improperly focused on only the cited
registered mark, without giving proper weight to third-party
69
evidence.
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that third-party registrations
may be given some weight in showing how third parties are using
similar marks on similar goods, but the court rejected Mighty Leaf
Tea’s contention that it had made an adequate showing of common
70
elements so as to render consumer confusion unlikely. Specifically,
the court cited the TTAB’s skeptical view of registrations containing
two letter strings “ML” within longer words or strings, such as
71
MLUXE, M’LIS, JML, and AMLAVI. The court agreed that such
registrations did not act as evidence that “ML” had any recognized
72
meaning or significance within the longer strings.
Outdoor Kids, Inc. v. Parris Manufacturing Co.
73
In Outdoor Kids, Inc. v. Parris Manufacturing Co., the Federal
Circuit agreed with the TTAB’s conclusion that customer confusion
was not likely between the trademarks KID’S OUTDOORS (and
Design), and OUTDOORS KIDS (word mark) for three reasons:
because the OUTDOORS KIDS mark was weak, the word portion of
the KID’S OUTDOORS (and Design) mark was descriptive, and the
transposition of the words in the respective marks and the presence
of an elk design element in the registered marks were sufficient to

5.

65. Id. at 1347–48, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258, 1260–61.
66. Id. at 1348, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
67. Id. at 1346, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259 (quoting In re E. I. DuPont
DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A.
1973)).
68. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
69. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
70. Id. at 1346–48, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259–60.
71. Id. at 1347, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
72. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
73. 385 F. App’x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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74

distinguish the marks. As a result, the Federal Circuit upheld the
Board’s dismissal of the cancellation proceedings brought by
75
Outdoor Kids.
Outdoor Kids obtained a registration for the word mark
OUTDOOR KIDS in connection with various types of outdoor
76
clothing and sporting goods for children. The registration included
a disclaimer of rights in the term “KIDS” apart from the mark as a
77
whole.
Subsequently, Parris obtained two registrations for the
78
following mark :

The goods listed in the Parris registrations were various types of
79
clothing and toys.
Outdoor Kids petitioned the TTAB to cancel both of the Parris
registrations based on a likelihood of confusion with Outdoor Kids’
80
prior existing registration. The TTAB found that the OUTDOOR
KIDS mark was weak and was not famous, placing special emphasis
on the fact that the mark was registered under a claim of acquired
81
distinctiveness with a disclaimer of the term “KIDS”. The TTAB
discussed several relevant DuPont factors, finding that while some
factors favored a finding of a likelihood of confusion, the differences
between the marks and the weakness of the word portions of the
82
The
marks ultimately rendered customer confusion unlikely.
83
Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision in all respects.
This case is notable because courts generally accord greater weight
to the words in a mark than the design features when they analyze a
likelihood of confusion claim; this case demonstrates that where, as
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 994–96.
Id. at 996.
Id. at 993.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 993.
Id.
Id. at 993–94.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 994–96.
Id. at 996.
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here, the words are highly descriptive or suggestive, the design may
84
be more significant than the wording. The TTAB considered the
elk design element to be a distinguishing feature between the marks,
85
and the Federal Circuit found no error in that conclusion. Specific
examples of likelihood of confusion cases that find a design more
86
significant than wording are few and far between, but this case
shows that the TTAB and the Federal Circuit are willing to recognize
the power that a design feature may have in militating against finding
a likelihood of confusion.
6. Anthony’s Pizza Holding Co. v. Anthony’s Pizza & Pasta
International, Inc.
In Anthony’s Pizza Holding Co. v. Anthony’s Pizza & Pasta
87
International, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed, in an unpublished,
per curiam opinion, the TTAB’s ruling, in a consolidated
proceeding, to sustain an opposition and grant a petition to cancel
after holding that ANTHONY’S PIZZA & PASTA is likely to be
88
confused with ANTHONY’S COAL-FIRED PIZZA.
Appellant Anthony’s Pizza Holding (“APH”) obtained a
registration for ANTHONY’S COAL-FIRED PIZZA in standard
character form, and sought to register the same mark with the
89
following design element both for restaurant services.

Appellee Anthony’s Pizza & Pasta (“APPI”) previously used and
registered ANTHONY’S PIZZA & PASTA, also for restaurant
90
services. In seeking to cancel the standard character word mark and
84. See id. at 994 (finding that where the word portion of Parris’ mark is
descriptive, the transposition of the words and the presence of the elk design were
sufficient to distinguish the two marks).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Parfums de Coeur, Ltd. v. Lazarus, No. 91161331, 2007 WL 683784,
at *1, *4, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1012, 1016 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (holding that in a
particular instance, the design element of the BODYMAN mark was very noticeable
and eye-catching, and therefore more dominant than the word element of the
mark).
87. No. 2010-1191, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23898 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2010) (per
curiam).
88. Id. at *1.
89. Id. at *1–2.
90. Id.
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to oppose the application for ANTHONY’S COAL-FIRED PIZZA (and
Design), appellee APPI argued that a likelihood of confusion existed
and that APPI, having used its mark for restaurant services for more
91
than twenty-three years, had priority. The TTAB and the Federal
92
Circuit agreed.
The appellant first challenged the TTAB’s focus on certain factors
93
While the TTAB
and its finding of likelihood of confusion.
considered all the DuPont factors for which there was record
evidence, it focused on the factors it considered dispositive, namely
94
similarity of the marks and relatedness of the services. Noting the
TTAB’s finding that the parties’ services are legally identical, the
Federal Circuit found that “‘[w]hen marks would appear on virtually
identical goods or services, the degree of similarity necessary to
95
support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.’”
Reviewing the TTAB’s analysis of the similarity of the marks, the
Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the TTAB’s
96
finding that the marks were similar. Specifically, the court noted
that the TTAB found that “ANTHONY’S” was the dominant portion
of each mark and that consumers were likely to shorten both marks
to “Anthony’s” or “Anthony’s Pizza,” particularly in light of the
97
weaker, descriptive remaining terms in the marks. Additionally, the
TTAB found that the design element in the composite mark was
comprised of the letter “A” and that the primary commercial
98
impression engendered thereby remains the name “Anthony’s.”
The TTAB also found that the flames in the design element and the
phrase “COAL-FIRED PIZZA” were so much smaller than the word
“ANTHONY’S” that they had little or no source-indicating
99
significance and should be given less weight. The Federal Circuit
held that the TTAB did not improperly dissect the marks and
“properly analyzed the marks in their entireties, while appropriately
100
focusing on the dominant element.”
101
The appellant also argued that APPI failed to police its mark.
The Federal Circuit held that the record did not show a reticence on
91. Id. at *2.
92. Id. at *1, *10.
93. Id. at *3.
94. Id. at *4.
95. Id. at *4–5 (quoting Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970
F.2d 874, 877, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citations omitted)).
96. Id. at *6.
97. Id. at *5.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *6.
101. Id. at *7–8.
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102

In so holding, the court
the appellee’s part to protect its mark.
considered evidence of the APPI’s watch service and the fact that no
evidence disclosed a confusingly similar mark to APPI’s mark either
registered with the Trademark Office or used in an overlapping
geographic area. The court also noted the fact that APPI took efforts
to minimize potential confusion with a third party by participating in
a co-existence agreement with the owner of the ANTHONY’S PIZZA
THE WORLD’S GREATEST mark, which established distinct trade
103
channels between the two.
The Federal Circuit found the TTAB’s determination to be
precisely consistent with the intent of the Lanham Act, which is to
104
prevent registration of marks likely to cause confusion.
This
decision is consistent with an abundance of case law holding that the
more related the goods and services, the less the degree of similarity
of the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.
B. Inherent Distinctiveness/Acquired Distinctiveness of Trade Dress
In both inherent distinctiveness decisions issued by the Federal
Circuit this year, it affirmed the test and governing law as stated in
105
Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd. Both cases below illustrate
that an applicant’s trade dress will not be deemed inherently
distinctive if the elements of the trade dress are either common
shapes or designs, usual in the relevant field, or if the trade dress
consists of a mere refinement of an existing form or ornamentation
for the particular class of goods or services.
1. Foundation for a Christian Civilization, Inc. v. Mary Queen of the
Third Millenium, Inc.
Foundation for a Christian Civilization, Inc. v. Mary Queen of the Third
106
Millenium, Inc. is an unpublished per curiam decision without
107
opinion affirming the TTAB’s judgment in favor of the opposer. In
this atypical trademark dispute, after five and one-half years of
contentious opposition between two formerly aligned religious
groups, both claiming a desire to use the contested trade dress, the
TTAB found, in a non-precedential decision, that the applicant’s
trade dress:

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at *7–8.
Id.
Id. at *10.
568 F.2d 1342, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
360 F. App’x 150 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Id.
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108

was incapable of distinguishing its goods and services.
The trade dress consisted of the design of a ceremonial religious
habit: a scapular containing a cross centered on the front and a
hood in the back, worn atop a habit with a metal and beaded belt
109
(the “Habit”).
The applicant sought to register the Habit for
“clothing, namely ceremonial habit worn by distinguished religious
representatives in certain ceremonies” and “promoting public
awareness of the need for healthy and religious families in the United
110
States.”
The TTAB first examined whether the opposer had standing to
oppose the registration of the trade dress on grounds that the
111
applicant’s mark lacked distinctiveness. “To have standing to assert
a ground that a mark lacks distinctiveness opposer must have a
present or prospective right to use the same or similar ‘mark’ in its
112
‘business.’” While the opposer had not used the Habit, the TTAB
held that such use is not required and found that the opposer had a
113
sufficient interest in the mark to support a finding of standing.
Additionally, the TTAB found that the opposer was, in effect, a
competitor of the applicant because the opposer—an organization
akin to a religious trade association—represented the legal interests
114
of and was affiliated with the group that actually used the Habit.
During examination of the application, the applicant was required
to establish acquired distinctiveness with respect to the identified

108. Mary Queen of the Third Millenium, Inc. v. Found. for a Christian
Civilization, Inc., No. 91157073, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 157 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2009).
109. Id. at *1–2.
110. Id. at *1.
111. Id. at *22.
112. Id. at *24 (citing Plyboo Am., Inc. v. Smith & Fong Co., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1633 (T.T.A.B. 1999)).
113. Id. at *25–26.
114. Id. at *25.

1176

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1159

115

No similar requirement was made with respect to the
goods.
applied-for services, and the Examining Attorney found that the
116
Habit was inherently distinctive with respect to those services. The
Examining Attorney accepted a declaration submitted by the
applicant claiming substantially exclusive and continuous use of the
Habit on clothing since 1978 and passed the mark on for publication
117
with respect to all goods and services listed in the application.
In arguing that the Habit was not distinctive of the applicant’s
goods and services, the opposer first argued that the applicant was
aware at the time of filing that the opposer’s members had appeared
118
publically wearing the Habit. The opposer also argued that prior to
the opposer’s and the applicant’s schism, the Habit had only been
used and perceived as a symbol of dedication to a life of sanctity, that
use of the Habit in religious celebrations far outweighed public use
by the applicant after the parties’ schism; therefore, the Habit had
119
not acquired distinctiveness.
The TTAB, in finding that the Habit lacked inherent
distinctiveness, analyzed the distinctiveness question regarding the
applied-for goods and services separately. First, the TTAB considered
whether the Habit was inherently distinctive with respect to the
120
applied-for services.
After finding that the Habit was a form of
trade dress that could be inherently distinctive, the TTAB focused on
“whether or not it is reasonable to assume that the consumer is
121
predisposed to view the trade dress as a source indicator.”
122
The TTAB applied the relevant Seabrook factors: 1) “[w]hether
the Habit is a common basic shape or design;” 2) “[w]hether the
Habit is unique or unusual in the particular field;” and 3) “[w]hether
the Habit is a mere refinement of a commonly-adopted and wellknown form or ornamentation for a particular class of goods or
123
services.”
The TTAB refined these factors to the single question,
“‘whether the design, shape or combination of elements is so unique,
unusual or unexpected in this market that one can assume without
proof that it will automatically be perceived by customers as an

115. Id. at *26.
116. Id. at *26–27.
117. Id.
118. Id. at *27.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *29.
121. Id. at *32.
122. Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 196 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 289 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
123. Mary Queen, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 157, at *29–30.
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124

Holding that the Habit was not
indicia of origin—a trademark.’”
inherently distinctive, the TTAB found the elements of the Habit
“[un]surprising,” “far from novel,” “conventional,” and “prosaic,”
such that the Habit could not be assumed to stand out and be
125
perceived as a single source indicator without proof of the same.
Instead, the TTAB found that the Habit fell within the “general realm
126
of habits worn by other religious groups.”
In finding that the applicant had not submitted sufficient evidence
to demonstrate acquired distinctiveness for either the applied-for
goods or services, the TTAB noted that because the trade dress of the
Habit was relatively ordinary, the applicant bore a heavy burden to
127
prove acquired distinctiveness.
Furthermore, it stated that due to
the atypical nature of the proceeding, the types of evidence
commonly used to demonstrate acquired distinctiveness—such as
sales and advertising figures, promotional efforts, product/service
popularity, brand awareness numbers, and market share—were not
128
present.
Considering the evidence as of the time of registrability (i.e.,
129
through the trial period) the TTAB discussed the amount and
nature of the demonstrated uses of the Habit, such as at weekly
meetings by approximately fourteen members, some public events,
130
parades and appearances, and in some media coverage. Ultimately,
the TTAB found that the uses were “relatively minor” and fell “far
short of establishing acquired distinctiveness of the mark sought to be
131
registered.” In parsing the evidence of events where the Habit was
displayed, the TTAB repeatedly noted as significant the small number
of attendees in total (typically less than one hundred), the small
number of attendees wearing the Habit (typically less than two
dozen), and, in particular, the small number of non-member
132
attendees (typically less than thirty).
Overall, the TTAB found the applicant’s evidence lacking
regarding exposure of the Habit to members of the public and held
that the “mere wearing of the Habit, mostly in private situations, does
not magically transform the Habit into a source indicator for
124. Id. at *33 (quoting J. T. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 8.02[4] (3d ed. 1993)).
125. Id. at *34.
126. Id.
127. Id. at *38.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *40–41 (citing Gen. Foods Corp. v. MGD Partners, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
479, 486 (T.T.A.B. 1984)).
130. Id. at *41–42.
131. Id. at *43.
132. Id. at *42–47.
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133

applicant’s goods and services.” Finally, the TTAB also found that
the opposer’s evidence establishing its own, more significant, public
use of the Habit rebutted the applicant’s contention of the requisite
134
substantially exclusive use. This finding further acted to defeat the
135
applicant’s claim of acquired distinctiveness.
In re Chippendales USA, Inc.
136
In In re Chippendales USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed the
TTAB’s denial after an ex parte appeal of the applicant’s application
for the Chippendales uniform trade dress, consisting of cuffs and a
bow tie (the “Cuffs & Collar trade dress”), holding that the trade

2.

137

dress was not inherently distinctive.
At the start of the proceedings, Chippendales already held an
incontestable registration for the Cuffs & Collar trade dress on the
138
basis of acquired distinctiveness.
After receiving a waiver of the
typical bar from registering the same mark for the same goods and
services, Chippendales proceeded with the instant application solely
in order to resolve the underlying substantive issue: whether the
139
Cuffs & Collar trade dress was inherently distinctive.
Stripping the Federal Circuit’s determination down to the bare
essentials, the TTAB and the Federal Circuit determined that the
trade dress was not inherently distinctive at the time Chippendales
140
sought to register the trade dress, given that the prior use and
registrations for adult female costumes consisted of cuffs and a bow

133. Id. at *47–48.
134. Id. at *50–51.
135. Id.
136. 622 F.3d 1346, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
137. Id. at 1358, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
138. Id. at 1349, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
139. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
140. As acknowledged in the TTAB’s opinion, the Federal Circuit held that the
appropriate time for measuring inherent distinctiveness is at the time of registration,
not at the time of first use of the mark. Id. at 1354–55, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1686–87.
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tie and that the relevant market was adult entertainment, not
141
specifically adult entertainment for women.
142
As they did in Mary Queen, both the TTAB and the Federal
Circuit applied the Seabrook factors in reaching their respective
143
decisions.
The Federal Circuit held that the issue of inherent
distinctiveness is a factual determination to be made by the TTAB,
and that “[i]f a mark satisfies any of the first three [Seabrook factors],
144
it is not inherently distinctive.”
Here, the Federal Circuit agreed with the TTAB’s conclusion that
the third Seabrook factor prevented the Cuffs & Collar trade dress
145
from being deemed inherently distinctive.
Citing Chippendales’
inspiration for its trade dress from the pervasive and “ubiquitous
Playboy bunny suit, which included cuffs, a collar and bowtie, a
146
corset, and a set of bunny ears,” which had been used for two
decades prior to Chippendales’ introduction of its Cuffs & Collar
trade dress, the TTAB and Federal Circuit concluded that the Cuffs &
Collar trade dress was merely “a refinement of an existing form of
147
ornamentation for the particular class of services.”
As such,
Chippendales’ trade dress was not of such a design that a consumer
would immediately rely on it to differentiate the services from those
148
of competitors, or as a single source identifier.
C. Genericness
Campbell v. Bassani Manufacturing
149
As with In re Achenbach Buschhutten GmbH, the outcome of
150
Campbell v. Bassani Manufacturing highlighted the need to strictly
adhere to rules and required procedure. In Campbell, the pro se
trademark applicant’s evidence of non-genericness was rejected after
1.

141. Id. at 1355–57, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687–89.
142. See supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of Mary Queen.
143. In re Chippendales, 622 F.3d at 1351–52, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684–85.
144. Id. at 1350–51, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
145. Id. at 1356–57, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
146. Id. at 1350, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 (citing In re Chippendales USA,
Inc., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1535, 1546 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2009)).
147. Id. at 1350, 1356–57, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 (citing In re Chippendales,
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542).
148. Id. at 1352, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
149. No. 2010-1192, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12248 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2010). See infra
Part II.F.2 for a further discussion of In re Achenbach.
150. 368 F. App’x 133 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied, No. 2009-1534, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9432 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2010) (per curiam). This opinion also involves a
procedural issue, namely, the effect of improper submission of evidence before the
Board.
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he failed to follow the proper procedure for authenticating
151
evidence.
In this case, the applicant “filed an application to register the mark
152
Bassani
X-PIPE for ‘internal combustion engine exhausts.’”
153
opposed the registration, arguing, inter alia, that X-PIPE is generic.
Bassani submitted evidence of genericness, including printouts of
magazine articles, newspaper articles, online publications, website
printouts, copies of catalogs, and a declaration of a competitor of
154
Campbell.
Campbell submitted evidence in response, but the
Board rejected Campbell’s evidence as inadmissible under
TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE
section 528.05(e) because the evidence was not accompanied by an
155
Bassani prevailed on
authenticating affidavit or declaration.
summary judgment and Campbell’s motion for reconsideration was
156
157
denied. Campbell appealed to the Federal Circuit.
In affirming the Board, the Federal Circuit framed the genericness
test as follows: “[t]o determine whether a term is generic, we identify
the genus of goods or services at issue and ask whether the term is
‘understood by the relevant public primarily to refer to that genus of
158
goods or services.’”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s
conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the relevant public primarily understood X-PIPE to refer to
“internal combustion engine exhausts which contain exhaust pipes
159
and discharge pipes.”
Along the way, the Federal Circuit rejected Campbell’s argument
that separate references by the Board to the genus as “exhaust pipes
and discharge pipes” in one instance, and as “internal combustion
engine exhausts” in another instance, created inconsistency which
160
would render the Board’s decision reversible. The Federal Circuit
also rejected Campbell’s argument that it was improper for the Board
161
to rely upon case law not cited by the parties.
While it is not clear that the outcome of this case would have been
different if Campbell had followed the procedural rules, it is clear
151. Id. at 133–35.
152. Id. at 133.
153. Id. at 133–34.
154. Id. at 134.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting In re 1800Mattress.com IP, L.L.C., 586 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2009)).
159. Id. (quotation omitted).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 135.
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that the trademark applicant had no leg to stand on given his failure
to authenticate his evidence. Pro se trademark applicants beware: the
rules apply equally to you.
In re Sharp
162
In In re Sharp, the Federal Circuit affirmed, per curiam, and
163
without opinion, the TTAB’s non-precedential decision in an ex
parte appeal that denied registration of the mark PHONECASTING
164
on the Supplemental Registry because it was generic.
The mark
PHONECASTING referred to “wireless communications services,
specifically, the transmission of multimedia content to mobile
165
telephones and wireless communications devices via the Internet.”
The Board’s discussion of genericism and the evidence presented by
the Examining Attorney provide useful guidelines regarding the types
of evidence sufficient to support a finding of genericism and why the
PHONECASTING application was denied pursuant to Section 23 of
166
In affirming the Examining Attorney’s finding
the Lanham Act.
that the mark was generic, the Board first found that there was “a
distinct genre or type of wireless communication services conducted
specifically by telephone,” and further found that the Examining
Attorney accurately described the category of services at issue as
167
“wireless communication services.”
In the remainder of the opinion, the Board discussed the plethora
of evidence submitted by the Trademark Office that demonstrated
168
how the relevant consumers perceived the term “phonecasting.”
The evidence included patent applications bearing the term in the
title and explaining the invention in accordance with the services
listed in the applicant’s application, dictionary and Wikipedia entries
2.

162. No. 2010-1148, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2010)
(per curiam). This opinion also involves a procedural issue regarding objections to
arguments and evidence presented by the Examining Attorney in an ex parte appeal.
Id.
163. Id.
164. In re Sharp, No. 78765022, 2009 WL 4085613, at *4 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2009).
During the ex parte appeal to the TTAB, the applicant raised a procedural issue,
objecting to the basis of the Trademark Office’s final refusal and its submission of
evidence to the Board in support of the refusal. Id. at *1–3. Specifically, the
applicant argued that the Examining Attorney improperly sought to change the basis
of the final refusal from descriptive to genericism; however, the Board rejected the
applicant’s argument in light of the Trademark Office’s mandate to register only
eligible marks and because it found the Examining Attorney’s citation to a wrong
rule inconsequential given that the Examining Attorney accurately explained her
position. Id.
165. Id. at *4.
166. Id. at *3–6; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a)–(c) (2006) (explaining the
registration process for the Supplemental Registry).
167. In re Sharp, 2009 WL 4085613, at *4.
168. Id. at *4–6.
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for the term, news articles discussing the term, numerous websites
and blogs referencing the term in connection with the services as
applied for by the applicant, and press releases from entities
169
After
launching “phonecasting service[s]” and applications.
considering all of the above, the Board found that “the primary
significance of the term ‘phonecasting’ as applied to wireless
170
communications services is a generic or common name.”
D. Descriptiveness
In re The Lex Group VA
171
In In re The Lex Group VA, an unpublished per curiam judgment
without opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s nonprecedential decision to affirm the Examining Attorney’s refusal to
register the mark E-LEX as merely descriptive of the applicant’s
172
services, pursuant to Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act.
The
applicant sought to register E-LEX for “litigation support services for
attorneys provided via an electronic network with court-specific
consultation on the rules and implementation of procedures for
173
filing electronically.”
In finding the mark descriptive, both the
Examining Attorney and the Board cited four dictionary definitions
in which “lex” means “law”, and the Board took judicial notice of the
174
definition.
The Examining Attorney and the Board also cited
numerous dictionary definitions, other references, and cases in which
the term “e” was found to be “a term that simply describes the fact
that the goods or services are associated with the internet,” or that
175
they are electronic in nature.
Finally, the Board noted that “the
addition of the hyphen is not significant” and that the combination
of the two terms does not have any unique meaning “that would be
176
different from the individual terms.”
1.

ERBE Elektronedizin GmbH v. Canady Technology L.L.C.
In the only color mark decision issued in 2010, ERBE Elektronedizin
177
GmbH v. Canady Technology L.L.C., the Federal Circuit affirmed both
2.

169. Id.
170. Id. at *6.
171. 383 F. App’x 949 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
172. Id. (affirming In re Lex Group VA, No. 76665046, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 534
(T.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2009)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2006) (not permitting
registration of a trademark if it is “merely descriptive”).
173. In re Lex Group, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 534, at *7.
174. Id. at *2, *4–5.
175. Id. at *4–7.
176. Id. at *6,*8.
177. 629 F.3d 1278, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
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the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Canady
dismissing ERBE’s trademark and trade dress infringement claims
and the district court’s finding that ERBE’s blue color mark and
178
trade dress were not protectable.
ERBE based its trademark infringement claims on a registration
from the Supplemental Register for the color blue for surgical
endoscopic probes and common law rights in trade dress consisting
179
of a blue tube with black markings at the end of the probe.
The
Examining Attorney denied ERBE’s application to register the color
mark on the Principal Register after determining that the color blue
on probes was ornamental and that ERBE failed to show evidence of
secondary meaning, of whether competitors used the color for their
180
products, and of whether the color was functional.
Asserting a mark registered only on the Supplemental Register,
181
ERBE bore the burden of proving that it owned a valid mark.
Specifically, in order to survive summary judgment, ERBE would have
had to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the color blue
was non-functional and had acquired secondary meaning in
182
connection with endoscopic probes. With respect to functionality,
a “[c]olor may not be granted trademark protection if the color
performs a utilitarian function in connection with the goods it
183
identifies or there are specific competitive advantages for use.” The
evidence in the record demonstrated that the color blue was
prevalent in the medical field and that blue was specifically used by
companies in the field on endoscopic probes because the color
184
enhances identification of the endoscopic tip.
Consequently, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the district court properly found the

178. Id. at 1280, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
179. Id. at 1282, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051.
180. Id. at 1287, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055–56. In dissenting, Judge Newman
challenged the majority’s recitation and application of trademark law regarding
functionality, stating that the fact that ERBE was granted a registration in the
Supplemental Register established in and of itself a genuine issue as to the question,
given that the Trademark Office’s Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure
dictates that functional marks are not registrable on either the Principal or
Supplemental Registers. See id. at 1294, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060 (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (citing TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1202.05(b) (7th
ed. 2010)). Judge Newman also criticized the majority’s and the district court’s
evaluations and determinations of factual issues, arguing that genuine issues of fact
existed both with respect to functionality and secondary meaning. Id. at 1294–96, 97
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060–61 (Newman, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1288, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
182. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
183. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull
Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1530–33, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120, 1122–24 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995).
184. Id. at 1289, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
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mark to
o be functio
onal and held
d that appro
opriation by ERBE alonee of
185
the color blue would place others at a comp
petitive disad
dvantage.
In diicta, the Fed
deral Circuit stated that it would also
o affirm on the
issue of
o secondaryy meaning of
o the mark
k because ERBE
E
failed to
present any eviden
nce that, “in
n the minds of the public, the prim
mary
significcance of the color blue is
i to identifyy ERBE as th
he source of the
186
producct.” The Federal
F
Circu
uit also summ
marily affirm
med the distrrict
court’s dismissal off ERBE’s traade dress claaims “because ERBE faiiled
to pressent any argu
ument that the
t black rin
ngs on the en
nd of the pro
obe
were non-function
n
nal” and, sim
milarly, beccause ERBE presented no
18
87
“eviden
nce relating to its trade dress
d
claims on
o appeal.”
G
y Descriptive
E. Primarily Geographically
Bell’s Brewery, Inc. v. Bell Hill
H Vineyards, L.L.C.
188
In Bell’s
B
Brewery, Inc. v. Bell Hill Vineyarrds, L.L.C., a per curiiam
decisio
on without opinion,
o
thee Federal Circuit affirmeed the TTA
AB’s
dismisssal of the ap
ppellant’s opposition prroceeding on
o all groun
nds:
likeliho
ood of conffusion, fraud
d, and that the applicaant’s mark was
w
189
primarrily geograp
phically desccriptive.
The appliccant sought to
1
190
registerr BELL HIL
LL for wine.
The appeellant owned
d a registration
191
for BEL
LL’S (and Design)
D
for beeer.
1.

The Board statted that th
he test for determining whether an
applicaant’s mark should be refused as “primarily geographicaally

185. Id.,
I 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 10
057.
186. Id.
I at 1290, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d
U
(BN
NA) at 1057.
187. Id.
I at 1291, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d
U
(BN
NA) at 1058.
188. No.
N 2010-1280, 2010 U.S. App
p. LEXIS 2549
99 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2010) (per
(
curiam).. This opinion also involves likelihood of con
nfusion and fraaud issues.
189. Id.
I at *1, aff’g,, No. 91177980, 2009 TTAB
B LEXIS 699 (T.T.A.B.
(
Dec. 18,
2009).
190. Bell’s
B
Brewery, Inc. v. Bell Hill Vineyards, L.L.C.,
L
No. 9117
77980, 2009 TT
TAB
LEXIS 699,
6
at *1 (T.T.A
A.B. Dec. 18, 20
009).
191. Id.
I at *1–2.
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192

descriptive,” under Section 2(e)(2) of the Lanham Act is whether
“the term in the mark sought to be registered is the name of a place
known generally to the public” and that “the public would . . . believe
that the goods or services for which the mark is sought to be
193
registered originate in that place.”
The Board makes the
determination “in connection with the goods or services with which
the mark is used and from the perspective of the relevant public for
194
those goods.”
While typically it may be presumed that there is a
goods/place association if the goods do in fact emanate from the
place named in the mark, an exception to that presumption exists if
“‘the place named in the mark is so obscure or remote that
purchasers would fail to recognize the term as indicating the
195
geographical source of the goods.’”
The Board referred to several evidentiary points in finding the
exception applicable and “Bell Hill” obscure, despite the fact that a
196
road named Bell Hill existed near the applicant.
Specifically, the
Board found that the opposer failed to establish that Bell Hill
designated a specific geographic region or location other than a local
road, known at best only by locals; further, the Board found that the
opposer’s handful of submitted marketing materials and menus
197
referencing Bell Hill was insufficient.
While the applicant
submitted its own evidence from the Geographic Names Information
198
Systems showing that no such geographic designation existed in its
area, the Board rejected this evidence as not relevant and insufficient
to create a genuine issue of material fact, reiterating that the opposer
need only prove that the place is known generally to the public and
199
that the public would make a goods/place association.
Once the Board determined that Bell Hill was remote, the
opposer’s fraud claim also quickly fell. Because the opposer did not
prove the stringent fraud elements, the Board found that the
applicant did not commit fraud when it represented to the

192. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (2006).
193. See Bell’s Brewery, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 699, at *14 (citing In re Societe Generale
des Eaux Minerales de Vittel S.A., 824 F.2d 957, 959, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450, 1452
(Fed Cir. 1987)).
194. See id. at *15 (citing In re MCO Properties Inc., 1995 WL 838977, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1154 (T.T.A.B. 1995)).
195. Id. at *14–15 (quoting Vittel, 824 F.2d at 959, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451).
196. Id. at *15–16.
197. Id.
198. The Geographic Names Information Systems database is maintained by the
U.S. Board of Geographic Names, within the U.S. Geological Survey in the
Department of the Interior. Id. at *16.
199. Id. at *16 n.8.
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Trademark Office that Bell Hill did not have a geographic
200
significance.
Finally, in applying the DuPont factors, the Board concluded that
201
there was no likelihood of confusion between the parties’ marks.
Of all the DuPont factors, the Board found that the dissimilarities of
202
the marks carried the most weight here.
In reaching this
conclusion, the Board emphasized the dominance of BELL’S in the
opposer’s mark, the fact that the applicant’s mark was a unitary
phrase giving the impression of a place, and that the connotation and
commercial impressions given off by both were sufficiently different
to outweigh any similarities based upon the common element
203
BELL.
F.

Abandonment

The Crash Dummy Movie, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.
204
In Crash Dummy Movie, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., the appellant and
applicant of the mark CRASH DUMMIES crashed and burned when
the Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the TTAB. The
court affirmed the TTAB’s decision to sustain an opposition brought
by Mattel based upon its marks CRASH DUMMIES and THE
205
INCREDIBLE CRASH DUMMIES. The Federal Circuit found that
substantial evidence existed to support the TTAB’s finding that
Mattel had overcome the statutory presumption of abandonment of
its marks and that “no doubt” existed that the appellant’s mark was
likely to be confused with the appellee’s marks in light of the parties’
206
agreement that likelihood of confusion existed.
Mattel’s former owner ceased use of its marks in late 1995 or early
207
208
1996. Mattel purchased the marks in 1997. Mattel recorded the
assignment of the marks in 1998, but the United States Patent and
Trademark Office cancelled the registrations in 2000 due to Mattel’s
209
failure to submit Section 8 declarations of use. The TTAB and the
Federal Circuit found that recordation of the trademark assignment
in 1998, evidence of toy development from 2000 to 2003, and a first
shipment of toys bearing the mark CRASH DUMMIES in December
1.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at *18.
Id. at *5–13.
Id. at *13.
Id. at *12–13.
601 F.3d 1387, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1389, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315–16.
Id. at 1390, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316.
Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316.
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2003 together constituted sufficient evidence to rebut the
210
presumption that the marks had been abandoned.
On appeal, under the “substantial evidence standard,” the Federal
Circuit must determine “whether a reasonable person might find that
211
the evidentiary record supports the agency’s conclusion.”
The
TTAB found that Mattel showed “reasonable grounds for the
suspension and plans to resume use in the reasonably foreseeable
212
future when the conditions requiring suspension abate[d].”
In
upholding the TTAB’s conclusion, the Federal Circuit pointed to
several specific facts. First, it referenced the fact that the marks had
not been abandoned before they were assigned to Mattel in 1997 and
213
Second, as the
that the appellant did not challenge this issue.
Federal Circuit reiterated, a finding of abandonment requires not
only a cessation of use, but also a finding of intent not to resume such
214
use. In holding Mattel had not abandoned the marks, the Federal
Circuit cited Mattel’s evidence that it intended to resume use of the
marks, specifically, Mattel’s (i) discussions with a third-party retailer
regarding an exclusive sales arrangement and retooling of the
product line in 1998, (ii) the fact that Mattel recorded the trademark
assignment in 1998, and (iii) the internal documents and testimony
regarding research and development efforts from 2000 to 2003 to
215
launch a new product line.
Finally, the Federal Circuit also cited
the shipment of toys bearing the mark at the end of 2003 as
supportive of Mattel’s witness’ testimony regarding the planning and
development of the new product line under the CRASH DUMMIES
216
mark.
The Federal Circuit also made it a point to note that
“cancellation of a trademark registration does not necessarily
translate into abandonment of common law trademark rights. Nor
217
does it establish an owner’s lack of intent to use a mark.”
G. “All or Substantially All” Gray Goods Infringement Test
Deere & Co. v. ITC
218
Deere & Co. v. ITC is the only 2010 trademark case that involved
an appeal from the United States International Trade Commission
(“ITC”). The case involved a challenge to the ITC’s application of

1.

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 1391-92, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316–18.
Id. at 1390, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316.
Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316.
Id. at 1391, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316–17.
Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006)).
Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
Id. at 1391–92, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
Id. at 1391, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
605 F.3d 1350, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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219

After review, the Federal
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
Circuit vacated and remanded the ITC’s judgment denying Deere &
Co. (“Deere”) an exclusion order after the ITC had determined that
the sale of European versions of John Deere harvesters in the United
220
States by third parties did not violate Section 337.
The Federal
Circuit held that the ITC improperly applied the “all or substantially
all” test for finding trademark infringement based on gray market
221
goods under the Tariff Act. Gray market goods are goods that are
“produced by the owner of the United States trademark or with its
222
consent, but [are] not authorized for sale in the United States.”
This was the second trip to the Federal Circuit for these litigants.
In 2004, the ITC had granted a general exclusion order barring
importation of European-version harvesters bearing Deere
trademarks, gray market Deere harvesters, which Bourdeau Bros.,
223
Inc., a Deere dealer, appealed to the Federal Circuit.
In that
appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated in part and remanded the ITC’s
decision, dictating that Deere show that “all or substantially all” of
Deere’s authorized domestic products were materially different from
224
the accused gray market goods. After remand, the ITC determined
that not “all or substantially all” of the authorized harvesters sold in
the United States were North American-version harvesters, thus
concluding that Deere was not entitled to relief for a violation of
Section 337 for gray market trademark infringement. That ITC
decision led to the instant appeal.
Deere manufactured self-propelled forage harvesters for sale in
Europe, but manufactured different forage harvesters for sale in the
225
United States (the “North American harvester”).
Both forage
harvesters, however, were sold under Deere trademarks that were
226
registered in the United States.
Deere objected to the sale of the
European version of the harvesters in the United States by various
third parties, and Deere contended that such sales infringed Deere’s
227
trademarks through gray market importation.
Deere’s products
were either sold by independent dealers who operated without

219. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006) (providing a trade remedy against unfair import
competition).
220. Deere, 605 F.3d at 1351, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207.
221. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207.
222. Id. at 1352, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
223. Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 444 F.3d 1317, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
1221 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
224. Id. at 1327, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1224.
225. Deere, 605 F.3d at 1352, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
226. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207.
227. Id. at 1351, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207.
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oversight from Deere or official dealers who operated pursuant to a
228
dealership agreement with Deere.
A trademark owner is entitled to recover for a violation of Section
337 for gray market trademark infringement as long as all or
substantially all of the trademark owner’s authorized sales in the
United States are of the permitted, United States version of the
229
The reasoning behind this rule is to prevent the
product.
inconsistency of allowing a trademark owner to argue that consumers
will be confused by the sale of gray goods, while simultaneously
allowing the trademark owner to sell goods other than its defined
230
United States product.
The ITC refused to find gray market goods infringement or allow
Deere to recover for a violation of Section 337 because the ITC
calculated that as many as 40% to 57% of the European harvesters
sold in the United States had been sold by “official” Deere dealers,
and consequently, Deere itself was responsible for introducing the
231
nonconforming goods into U.S. commerce.
On appeal, Deere first challenged which categories of European
harvester sales were counted as “authorized” sales; however, the
Federal Circuit affirmed each of the ITC’s decisions, finding that they
232
were supported by substantial evidence. Of note, the ITC and the
Federal Circuit held that apparent authority of official Deere
dealers—defined as buyers’ reasonable belief based on the acts and
omissions of Deere that sales were authorized—is sufficient for sales
233
to be deemed authorized.
The Federal Circuit also held that as
long as a dealer was an “official” dealer, it did not matter whether the
dealer that made the sale into the United States was located in
234
Europe or the United States.
Second, Deere argued that regardless of the number of
“authorized” sales of European harvesters, the ITC still misapplied
235
the formula used to determine the “all or substantially all test.” The
Federal Circuit agreed that the ITC misapplied the formula that the
Federal Circuit itself had dictated be used in a prior decision in this
236
matter.
Instead of dividing the number of authorized European
228. Id. at 1352, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207–08.
229. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
230. Id. at 1352–53, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
231. Id. at 1354–55, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209–10.
232. Id. at 1355–57, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210–11.
233. Id. at 1357, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211–12.
234. Id. at 1357–58, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
235. Id. at 1358–59, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
236. See id. at 1360, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214 (explaining the proper way to
calculate the “all or substantially all” test in this case as requiring Deere to establish
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the number of sales of European forage
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harvesters sold in the United States (141) by the total number of
authorized harvesters sold in the United States (both the North
American and the European versions (between 4,541 and 4,555)), the
ITC divided the number of authorized European harvesters sold in
the United States (141) by only the total number of European
237
harvester versions sold in the United States (between 247 and 347).
Thus, the true calculation of authorized sales totaled only 3.1% to
3.4%, in stark contrast to the ITC’s calculation that 40% to 57% of
the non-confirming, European harvesters sold in the United States
238
were authorized.
While a prior decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit found that 4.4% of authorized gray goods sales
239
was a small enough number to allow a trademark owner relief, the
Federal Circuit remanded the case back to the ITC to determine
whether 3.1% to 3.4% is an insubstantial percentage. If deemed
insubstantial, Deere would be entitled to relief under Section 337 of
the Tariff Act, and the gray market harvesters (European-version
240
harvesters) would be excluded from the United States.
II. PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES

241

This year, the Federal Circuit rendered several decisions which
made it clear that not only do litigants have trouble following rules,
but that the TTAB also must pay them closer attention.

harvesters was so small that substantially all of Deere’s sales in the United States were
of North American forage harvesters, such that substantially all of the authorized
sales were of goods bearing the asserted material differences”).
237. Id. at 1359, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214–15.
238. Id. at 1360, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214–15.
239. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 7–8 (2d Cir.
1996) (reversing the lower court’s denial of injunctive relief to trademark owner).
240. Deere, 605 F.3d at 1361, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
241. See supra Part I. For additional procedural decisions, see, e.g., In re Sharp, No.
2010-1148, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2010) (per curiam)
(objections to arguments and evidence presented by the Examining Attorney in ex
parte appeal); Odom’s Tenn. Pride Sausage v. FF Acquisition, L.L.C., 600 F.3d 1343,
1346, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2030 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (effect of unpled claims);
Campbell v. Bassani Mfg., 368 F. App’x 133 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(repercussions for failure to adhere to TTAB’s authentication of evidence
procedure); Univ. of S.C. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 367 F. App’x 129 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 387 (2010) (standing requirements); Found. for a Christian
Civilization, Inc. v. Mary Queen of the Third Millenium, Inc., 360 F. App’x 150 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (standing requirements).
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A. Motion for Leave to Amend
Fred Beverages, Inc. v. Fred’s Capital Management Co.
242
In Fred Beverages, Inc. v. Fred’s Capital Management Co., the Federal
Circuit held that the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner when it denied a motion for leave to amend a petition for
243
cancellation of a registered trademark.
Fred Beverages, Inc. originally sought cancellation of Fred’s Capital
Management Company’s registration in International Class 32 on the
244
grounds of abandonment.
The beverage company’s original
petition for cancellation was accompanied by the $300.00 payment
245
required by 37 C.F.R. § 2.6(a)(16).
Subsequently, the beverage
company filed a motion for leave to amend its cancellation petition
to state new grounds of cancellation in connection with International
Classes 2, 25, 28, and 29 of the twelve-class registration and to include
fraud as an additional ground for cancellation of the registration in
246
The Board denied the motion for leave to
International Class 32.
amend the cancellation petition because movant Fred Beverages, Inc.
247
did not submit a $300.00 payment with its motion.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the Board had no legal basis
248
for its decision.
According to the Federal Circuit, 37 C.F.R. §
2.6(a)(16) requires a $300.00 payment only with respect to the filing
249
However, because there is no stated
of a petition of cancellation.
rule or established practice requiring that a motion for leave to
amend a petition for cancellation be accompanied by a statutory fee
corresponding to the classes for which cancellation is sought by
amendment, there was no authority to support the Board’s
250
decision.
Further, the Federal Circuit noted that in other cases, the Board
granted or deferred ruling on motions for leave and set a subsequent
251
deadline for the payment of the underlying fee. Because the Board
departed here from established precedent without a reasoned
1.

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

605 F.3d 963, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1958 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 964, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958.
Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958.
Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958.
Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959.
Id. at 965, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959.
Id. at 967, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960.
Id. at 966, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959.
Id. at 966–67, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959–60.
Id. at 967, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960.
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explanation, the Federal Circuit vacated its decision as arbitrary and
252
capricious.
B. Case or Controversy and Standing to Sue
Green Edge Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Rubber Mulch Etc., L.L.C.
253
In Green Edge Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Rubber Mulch Etc., L.L.C., the
Federal Circuit reversed the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri’s dismissal of defendant Rubber Mulch’s
254
counterclaim on the basis of lack of controversy.
The Federal
Circuit held that a cease and desist letter threatening suit and a
current trademark infringement claim constituted sufficient case or
controversy to permit Rubber Mulch to proceed with its
255
counterclaim.
Rubber Mulch sought a declaratory judgment of
noninfringement against both the plaintiff and the third-party
trademark assignee, International Mulch, brought into the case by
256
the defendants as a second counterclaim defendant.
The Federal
Circuit also affirmed the district court’s decision finding no case or
controversy and dismissing defendant Rubber Resources’
counterclaims because the trademark infringement claim did not
extend to Rubber Resources, nor had it been a recipient of a cease
257
and desist letter. The Federal Circuit explained that only the party
with legal title to the mark is entitled to prosecute an infringement
258
suit.
Ruling in favor of International Mulch on its motion for summary
judgment, the District Court found that no case or controversy
existed because International Mulch had not demanded in its cease
259
and desist letter that Rubber Mulch cease using the mark.
The
District Court found that although Rubber Mulch did have a
reasonable apprehension of litigation as a result of the cease and
desist letter, no case or controversy existed because Rubber Mulch
had not demonstrated that it intended to use “Rubber Mulch” as a
1.

252. See id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960 (citing Pontchartrain Broad. Co. v FCC,
15 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1994) and Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 554 v.
Salem-Gravure, 843 F.2d 1490, 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1988) for the proposition that, where
an agency “depart[s] from established precedent without a reasoned explanation
[its] decisions will be vacated as arbitrary and capricious”).
253. 620 F.3d 1287, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
254. Id. at 1290, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
255. Id. at 1301, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
256. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
257. Id. at 1302, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
258. Id. at 1301, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
259. Id. at 1292–93, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
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The
trademark, and instead planned only to use it descriptively.
defendants appealed the dismissal of their counterclaims.
The Federal Circuit found appellee International Mulch’s
arguments that Rubber Mulch claimed the term was not being used
as a trademark and was only descriptive were “disingenuous” because
Rubber Mulch stated that it did intend to continue using the phrase
261
“Rubber Mulch.” The Federal Circuit found that those arguments
related to Rubber Mulch’s defenses to the plaintiff’s infringement
claim, and did not impact whether a case or controversy existed with
respect to Rubber Mulch’s noninfringement and invalidity
262
counterclaims.
Instead, the Federal Circuit held that its analysis
with respect to whether a case or controversy existed was satisfied, as
both the plaintiff and International Mulch accused Rubber Mulch of
“infringing a valid trademark, which is the hallmark of an actual
263
controversy.”
During the appellate hearing, International Mulch (the alleged
assignee of the plaintiff’s trademark) sought to influence the Federal
Circuit’s determination regarding case or controversy with respect to
the counterclaims by representing that the plaintiff was prepared to
drop its trademark infringement claim against Rubber Mulch
264
entirely.
The Federal Circuit clarified that the plaintiff’s offer to
dismiss the infringement claim did not divest the court of its
265
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
In discussing the fact that the legal title to the mark allegedly
infringed upon was in question, the Federal Circuit also reiterated
that only the party with the legal title to the mark was entitled to
prosecute an infringement suit, and that “if International Mulch
[was] found to be the legitimate assignee, only [it would have]
266
standing to sue for infringement.”
The Federal Circuit explained
that in such circumstances, a “court may not dismiss an action for
failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until,
after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real
267
party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.”
Here, the Federal Circuit stated that if plaintiff Green Edge was
“ultimately found not to have standing to pursue its infringement

260. Id. at 1293, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428–29.
261. Id. at 1301–02, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
262. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
263. Id. at 1302, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
264. Id. at 1301 n.4, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 n.4.
265. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 n.4.
266. Id. at 1301, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
267. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435 (citing In re Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 579 F.3d
478, 487 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(3))).
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claim,” International Mulch could be substituted as the party in
268
interest.
C. Default Judgment; Ordering of Determination of Multiple Motions;
Timing of Suspension
Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc.
269
In Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc., the Federal Circuit vacated the
TTAB’s entry of a default judgment against the respondent in a
270
cancellation proceeding and remanded the case. While noting the
TTAB’s apparent failure to discuss its own rule, Trademark Rule
2.217(d), in its opinion below, the Federal Circuit refrained from
ruling on the rule’s applicability in the first instance and instead
271
vacated the lower decision of the TTAB. Trademark Rule 2.127(d)
relates to suspension of proceedings upon filing dispositive
272
motions.
Petitioner Super Bakery filed a motion to compel discovery
responses from the pro se respondent, Benedict, who failed to comply
273
with the TTAB’s order directing responses to the petitioner.
Instead of granting Super Bakery’s motion for a default judgment,
the TTAB gave Benedict a second chance to produce discovery
274
responses. The day before the TTAB’s second established deadline,
Benedict filed a motion for summary judgment instead of producing
275
discovery.
In response, the TTAB granted Super Bakery’s motion
276
for sanctions and for default judgment.
The Federal Circuit pointed to Trademark Rule 2.127(d), which
provides, “[w]hen any party files . . . a motion for summary
judgment . . . the case will be suspended . . . with respect to all
matters not germane to the motion and no party should file any
277
paper which is not germane to the motion . . . .”
Though it
disagreed with the appellant’s interpretation of Trademark Rule
2.127(d) that his discovery production requirements became
suspended once he had filed his summary judgment motion the day
before his discovery obligations were due, the Federal Circuit noted
that the TTAB failed to address the applicability of Trademark Rule
1.

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
367 F. App’x 161 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Id. at 162–63.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 162; 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(d).
Super Bakery, 367 F. App’x at 162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(d) (2010).
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278

2.127(d) in its decision. Thus, the court remanded the case back to
279
the TTAB.
On remand, the TTAB held, in a precedential decision, that the
filing of a motion for summary judgment, or other dispositive
motion, does not automatically suspend a proceeding and noted that
the same conclusion was reached during the rulemaking process for
280
The TTAB held that only an order of
Trademark Rule 2.127(d).
the TTAB formally suspending the proceedings has such effect from
the date of the suspension forward, unless otherwise indicated by the
281
TTAB in the suspension order.
Here, the TTAB’s suspension order did not issue until after
282
Benedict’s discovery responses were due. The TTAB held that the
pendency of Benedict’s “clearly meritless” motion did not, in this
case, constitute good cause for failing to comply with the TTAB’s
283
prior order. The TTAB, therefore, held that the applicability of 37
C.F.R. § 2.127(d) did not change its decision to enter judgment
284
against the respondent and to cancel his registration.
285
Although an unpublished opinion, Benedict stands as yet another
reminder to the TTAB that it must not ignore its own stated
procedural rules. Despite the TTAB’s and the opposing party’s
286
apparent frustration with Benedict’s actions before the TTAB, the
TTAB must at least address applicable procedural issues in its
decisions, particularly where, as here, the decision resulted in a
judgment against the respondent.
D. Treatment of Non-Response to Motion
Sadeh v. Biggs
287
In Sadeh v. Biggs, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s
dismissal of the subject opposition with prejudice and affirmed its
288
The opposer failed to
denial of a motion for reconsideration.
1.

278. Super Bakery, 367 F. App’x at 162–63.
279. Id.
280. Super Bakery, Inc. v. Benedict, No. 92047859, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 384, at *5,
96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1134, 1136 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 16, 2010).
281. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
282. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
283. Id. at *6–7, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
284. Id. at *8, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
285. But see infra text accompanying note 311 (discussing that citation to
nonprecedential decisions is acceptable in certain contexts).
286. Benedict v. Super Bakery, 367 F. App’x 161, 163 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per
curiam); Super Bakery, Inc., 2010 TTAB LEXIS 384, at *7–8, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1136.
287. 374 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
288. Id. at 997.
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provide any response to the applicant’s motion to dismiss, and could
289
not, on appeal, proffer an adequate explanation for failing to do so.
Instead, the opposer argued on appeal that he was not obliged to
respond to the motion to dismiss because he felt his notice of
opposition was “bullet proof,” and he did not argue that extenuating
290
circumstances existed justifying his failure to respond.
In an
unpublished opinion, the Federal Circuit stated that “[l]itigation is
run by rules designed to assure orderly conduct of the proceedings”
and held that the TTAB did not abuse its discretion in granting the
applicant’s motion to dismiss as conceded, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §
291
2.127(a).
E. Motion for Vacatur and Remand; Appeal Moot
In re Hyatt
292
In In re Hyatt, the Federal Circuit vacated the underlying decision
of the TTAB in an ex parte appeal in which the TTAB had affirmed
the refusal of the appellant’s application on the basis of likelihood of
293
confusion with a prior registration.
The court remanded the case
to the TTAB pursuant to a motion of the Director of the Trademark
Office which stated that the Federal Circuit appeal was now moot, as
the Trademark Office had cancelled the registration upon which
denial of the appellant’s application was based just four days prior to
294
the parties’ scheduled oral argument before the Federal Circuit.
Of note, the Director also informed the Federal Circuit that
“procedures are being put in place to check registration status prior
295
to oral argument to prevent a similar occurrence in the future.”
1.

F.

Federal Circuit Rule Compliance

As the below three cases illustrate, an appellant’s entire appeal may
be jeopardized and not heard on the merits if the appellant, or the
appellant’s counsel, fails to strictly adhere to the procedural rules and
timeline deadlines of the Federal Circuit.

289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. (quoting Chesebrough-Pond’s Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 618 F.2d 776, 780, 205
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 888, 891 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
292. No. 2009-1229, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26199 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 7, 2010).
293. Id.; see In re Hyatt, No. 76611740, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 106, at *3, *7, *16–17
(T.T.A.B. Nov. 18, 2008).
294. In re Hyatt, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26199, at *1; Director’s Opposed Motion
for Vacatur and Remand at 1–2, In re Hyatt, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26199 (Feb. 6,
2011), available at
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=76611740&pty=EXA&eno=22.
295. Director’s Opposed Motion for Vacatur and Remand supra note 294, at 3.
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Stoller v. Best Data Products, Inc.
296
perhaps the harshest
In Stoller v. Best Data Products, Inc.,
application of its rules in 2010, the Federal Circuit denied as moot
297
appellant Leo Stoller’s motion seeking an extension of time to file
his opening brief immediately after dismissing the entire appeal
because Stoller had failed to pay the Federal Circuit docketing fee
298
that was due eight days earlier.
The appeal stemmed from a TTAB opposition proceeding related
to an application for the mark STEALTH. An application had been
filed over a decade earlier in 1998, to which an opposition was
sustained after the applicant, The Society for the Prevention of
Trademark Abuse, L.L.C., filed to expressly abandon the
299
application.
Stoller filed the appeal after the TTAB refused
initially, and again upon reconsideration, to substitute Stoller as the
300
assignee applicant owner of the opposed STEALTH application.
Stoller moved for substitution and to extend his time to answer after
the opposition had been sustained due to the current record holder’s
301
express abandonment. The TTAB refused Stoller’s motions, citing
a complete lack of evidence regarding the chain of title argued by
302
Stoller.
Despite the fact that only eight days had passed between the
docketing fee due date and the Federal Circuit’s dismissal of the
appeal in an unpublished opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed its
1.

296. No. 2010-1031, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4354 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2010).
297. By way of background, it is notable that the judicial system seems to have run
out of patience with Mr. Stoller. Stoller has been sanctioned numerous times for
being a vexatious litigant and for other dubious conduct. See, e.g., Order at 2, In re
Leo D. Stoller, No. 1:07-cv-05118 (7th Cir. Dec. 4, 2009) (No. 08-4240), available at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/093569/16/0.pdf?1272466371 (ordering all federal courts in the Seventh Circuit to
“return unfiled any papers submitted either directly or indirectly by [Mr. Stoller] or
on his behalf[,]” except for those relating to criminal cases and applications for writs
of habeas corpus); see also Central Mfg. Co. v. Brett, No. 04-C-3049, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23379, at *2, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1662, 1664 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2005), aff’d 492
F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Stoller appears to be running an industry that produces
often spurious, vexatious, and harassing federal litigation.”).
298. Stoller v. Best Data Prods., Inc., No. 2010-1031, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4354,
at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2010).
299. Best Data Prods., Inc. v. Soc’y for Prevention of Trademark Abuse, L.L.C.,
No. 91190926 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 1, 2009).
300. See id. (denying Stoller’s request for reconsideration and affirming the
Board’s August 5, 2009 order, as modified by the Board’s August 7, 2009 order).
301. Motion to Substitute Party, Best Data Prods., Inc. v. Leo Stoller, Opposition
No. 91190926 (T.T.A.B. 2009), available at
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91190926&pty=OPP&eno=4.
302. See Best Data Prods., Opposition No. 91190926 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 1, 2009),
available at http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=76611740&pty=EXA&eno=22
(denying Stoller’s request for reconsideration and affirming the Board’s August 5,
2009 order, as modified by the Board’s August 7, 2009 order).
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303

decision upon Stoller’s motion for reconsideration. While the best
practice to take away from this opinion is to strictly adhere to all
procedural deadlines of the Federal Circuit, one cannot help but
wonder whether similar treatment would have befallen an appellant
who did not have Stoller’s reputation and had not previously brought
appeals before the Federal Circuit on more than fifteen occasions.
In re Achenbach Buschhutten GmbH
304
In re Achenbach Buschhutten GmbH also highlighted the need to
strictly follow the rules of the Federal Circuit. In that case, the
attorney for trademark applicant Achenbach Buschhutten GmbH
appealed the TTAB’s affirmation of the Examining Attorney’s final
refusal to register the proposed mark OPTIFOIL (and Design) under
305
Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act. Counsel for Achenbach failed to
become a member of the Federal Circuit bar as required by Federal
Circuit Rule 46, and the Federal Circuit therefore dismissed the
306
appeal for failure to prosecute in accordance with the rules.

2.

3. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin v. Amerisure Mutual
Insurance Co.
307
General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin v. Amerisure Mutual Insurance Co.
provides another example of the Federal Circuit’s strict application of
its rules, to the detriment of appellants. General Casualty Co. failed
to timely file its appellate brief, as required by Federal Circuit Rule
308
31(a).
Citing the same rule, the Federal Circuit dismissed the
309
appeal.
CONCLUSION
All told, the Federal Circuit did not promulgate any momentous
advances or changes in trademark law in 2010. This is not to say that
it was not a busy year for the Federal Circuit, as the number of
trademark cases decided by the court in 2010 was in line with recent
years, and the court’s decision to designate only eight of the twentythree trademark cases as precedential was also comparable to recent
310
years.
In any event, the cases surveyed herein may be useful for
303. Stoller, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4354, at *1.
304. No. 2010-1192, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12248 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2010).
305. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006); In re Achenbach Buschutten GbmH, No.
76581689, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 650 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 26, 2009).
306. In re Achenbach, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12248, at *1.
307. No. 2010-1422, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26870 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2010).
308. Id. at *1.
309. Id.
310. The Federal Circuit issued sixteen trademark decisions in 2009 (including
nine designated precedential), eight trademark decisions in 2008 (one designated
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similarly situated litigants. Practitioners are reminded that since the
adoption of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, all federal
opinions, including those of the Federal Circuit, issued on or after
January 1, 2007, are citable in all federal courts even if designated as
311
unpublished or nonprecedential. Further, the Federal Circuit may
refer to nonprecedential dispositions in opinions or orders and may
look to nonprecedential dispositions for guidance or persuasive
312
reasoning.
The decision of the court to affirm four judgments in
2010 without opinion reflects the court’s determination that an
313
opinion in those cases would have no precedential value, but these
cases should not be overlooked by practitioners who may wish to
supplement other authority.
Practitioners should be aware that this article is a survey only of
2010 trademark judgments issued by the Federal Circuit. Opinions
issued by the Federal Circuit in 2010 involving other substantive areas
of the law may also impact trademark law practice but are not
considered or discussed herein.

precedential), fifteen trademark decisions in 2007 (eight designated precedential),
eleven trademark decisions in 2006 (seven designated precedential), and twelve
trademark decisions in 2005 (six designated precedential). See Stephen R. Baird,
2005 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1263, 1263–64 (2006);
Stephanie H. Bald & David M. Kelly, 2008 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal
Circuit, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 947, 948 (2009); Rebeccah Gan, 2009 Trademark Law
Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2010); Christine Haight
Farley & Geri L. Haight, Review of the 2006 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 987, 988 (2007); David Jaquette & Susan M. Kayser, 2007 Trademark
Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1039, 1040 (2008).
311. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1; FED. CIR. R. 32.1(c). By way of comparison, TTAB
decisions not designed as precedential “are not citable authority and will not be
considered by the Board.” TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF
PROCEDURE § 1203.02(f) (2004).
312. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(d).
313. FED. CIR. R. 36. We note that in all four instances the underlying TTAB
opinion was also nonprecedential.

